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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, CHARTER DIALOGUE AND DEFERENCE
Rosalind Dixon*
For those concerned about the democratic legitimacy of Charter review by
Canadian courts, the idea of dialogue offers a promising midway path
between the extremes of judicial and legislative supremacy. Current
dialogue theory, however, largely fails to live up to this promise of
compromise. Instead of distinguishing democratic worries associated with
US style, strong-form judicial review, it largely endorses the legitimacy of
such review. For dialogue to live up to its original promise, a new theory
that more clearly distinguishes Canada from the United States is required.
In this article, which offers a new theory of dialogue, the willingness of the
Supreme Court of Canada to defer to reasonable legislative sequels will
be the key to success. As a result, section 33 of the Charter will play a
valuable but largely background role in promoting dialogue. The
advantage of this approach, compared to rival approaches that would
weaken judicial review, is that it is more realistic and more in line with
existing SCC practice. Moreover, it is normatively desirable when judged
from the perspective of the courts’ capacity to counter blockages in the
legislative process that might otherwise impair the enjoyment of Charter
rights.

For some, more than enough has been said about the idea of dialogue as a metaphor for
the relationship between courts and legislatures under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.1 There have been more than ten years of debate about dialogue in Canada,2
*Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. The author wishes to thank Sujit Choudhry,
Stephen Gardbaum, Tom Ginsburg, Janet Hiebert, Richard Holden, Richard McAdams, Frank Michelman,
Gillian Sinnott, Adrienne Stone, Mark Tushnet, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, participants in a workshop at the
Melbourne Center for Comparative Constitutional Studies, and the two anonymous referees at the Osgoode
Hall L.J. for helpful suggestions and comments on previous drafts of this article. Particular thanks are due
to Jamie Cameron for her generous help in revising and improving multiple versions of the article, and to
Emily Tancer for her great research assistance. All errors, of course, remain those of the author.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
2
See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 75; Kent Roach, “Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and
Canadian Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481 [Roach, “Common Law”]; Kent Roach, The Supreme
Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001); Kent Roach,
“Dialogic Judicial Review and its Critics” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R. (2d) 49 at 54 [Roach, “Dialogic Review”];
Kent Roach, “Constitutional, Remedial, and International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian
Experience” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 537 [Roach, “Canadian Experience”]; Kent Roach, “A
Dialogue About Principle and a Principled Dialogue: Justice Iacobucci's Substantive Approach to
Dialogue” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 449; and Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton and Wade K. Wright,
“Charter Dialogue Revisited—Or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 2.

but little progress in persuading skeptics that the practice of judicial review by the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) can be reconciled with a commitment to selfgovernment in a democracy, as the original literature on dialogue promised.3
For skeptics, the primary democratic worry about judicial review under the
Charter is that, when it comes to open-ended Charter guarantees, Canadian courts may
adopt an interpretation that is directly counter-majoritarian in nature.4 While the Charter
is not intended to be a purely majoritarian instrument, from a democratic point of view,
the constitutional understandings of a majority of Canadians still have an important role
to play in the interpretation of the Charter. Rights guarantees are open-ended and permit
multiple reasonable interpretations—there is no objectively ascertainable, “correct”
interpretation.5 This applies to the text and history of the Charter, to Supreme Court
precedent, and as a matter of Charter values,—because at an abstract philosophical level,
there will be just as much (if not more) room for reasonable disagreement about the scope
and priority to be given to particular, individual rights.6
If Canada is committed to principles of democracy, as section 1 of the Charter
suggests, the only principled way of interpreting such guarantees will be by reference to
the actual understandings of Canadians about specific Charter guarantees, or about the
more general requirements of section 1 itself. If equality matters in the process of selfgovernment, the understandings of every Canadian should also count in a roughly equal
way in this context. A problem arises when the SCC prefers its own understanding of the
Charter to that of a clear majority of Canadians.
In the United States, this problem has spawned a large literature on the “countermajoritarian difficulty” associated with judicial review by the United States Supreme
Court (USSC).7 The sense of difficulty is particularly acute, most American scholars
agree, because it is almost impossible to modify the effect of Supreme Court decisions by
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For the promise of reconciliation in dialogue theory, see the special issue, Charter Dialogue: Ten Years
Later, (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. See also. Hogg and Bushell, ibid. at 105. For the failure of dialogic
arguments to persuade skeptics, See, e.g., Grant Huscroft, “Rationalizing Judicial Power: The Mischief of
Dialogue Theory” in James B. Kelly and Christopher P. Manfredi, eds., Contested Constitutionalism:
Reflections on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
2008); Andrew Petter, “Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn’t
Such a Good Thing After All)” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 147.
4
See, e.g., Petter, ibid. In the US context, compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch:
The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) at 16-23, 235.
For other democratic objections to judicial review, such as those based on its capacity to discourage or
distort legislative constitutional deliberation, see James B. Thayer, “The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law” (1893-1894) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129; Mark Tushnet, “Policy Distortion and
Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty” (1995-1996) 94
Mich. L. Rev. 245 at 292, 299 [Tushnet, “Policy Distortion”].
5
See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 112-13, 14963 [Waldron, Disagreement].
6
Ibid.
7
See Barry Friedman, “The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five” (2002-2003) 112 Yale L.J. 153 [Friedman, “Academic Obsession”].
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amending the Constitution under the terms of Article V.8 It is also compounded by the
insistence of the USSC, in recent years, upon its broad and exclusive authority to
determine the meaning of constitutional rights—even in the face of legislative “dialogue”
by Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—and by its rigid, categorical
approach to assessing the constitutionality of particular legislative provisions.9
In Canada, dialogue scholars, such as Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, have
argued that certain structural features of the Charter, together with the actual record of
legislative response to SCC decisions, mean that these same concerns about democratic
legitimacy “cannot be sustained” or, at the very least, are “greatly diminished.”10 They
argue that because, in reliance on these features, Parliament or the legislature has almost
always been able to reverse, modify, or avoid the effect of SCC Charter decisions with
which they disagree, “it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the Court and
the competent legislative body as a dialogue.”11 Together with Wade Wright, Hogg and
Bushell further suggest that this dialogue indicates that, under the Charter, a balance is
achieved between the extremes of judicial supremacy and legislative supremacy, known
as “strong-form” and “weak-form” judicial review, respectively.12 More specifically, they
suggest that, since the Charter, Canada has adopted something of “a halfway house
between the strong form of judicial review typified by the United States and the statutory
bill of rights typified by the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960.”13
The idea of dialogue also clearly supports this understanding.14 By describing the
possibility of an ongoing exchange between courts and legislatures in their interpretations
of the Charter, dialogue as a metaphor clearly points to a potential midway path between
the extremes of both legislative and judicial finality. It suggests that, rather than courts or
legislatures being wholly final in their interpretation of the Charter, both court decisions
and legislative responses to those decisions—“legislative sequels”— could be understood
to have a much more provisional, penultimate legal force.15
8

See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of
Constitutional Amendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
9
For a critique of the Supreme Court’s approach in this context from a perspective sympathetic to,
though not synonymous with, new dialogue theory, See, e.g., Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel,
“Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power” (2003) 78
Ind. L.J. 1 at 25, 28.
10
Hogg and Bushell, supra note 2 at 80, 105.
11
Ibid. at 79.
12
Hogg, Bushell Thornton and Wright, supra note 2 at 4. On the idea of strong- versus weak-form
judicial review, see Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights
in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) [Tushnet, Weak Courts].
13
Hogg, Bushell Thornton and Wright, supra note 2 at 29.
14
Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary, _2ded. (1989) s.v. “dialogue.”
Dialogue, n.: 1. a. A conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk
together; b. Verbal interchange of thought between two or more persons, conversation; c. In Politics
… valuable or constructive discussion or communication.
15
Cf. Dan T. Coenen, “A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with SecondLook Rules of Interbranch Dialogue” (2000-2001) 42 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1575 at 1582-83 (arguing that
dialogue involves court decisions being provisional or revisable in character); Michael J. Perry, “Protecting
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On closer inspection, however, current dialogue theory’s interpretation of
provisions such as sections 1 and 33 of the Charter provides little basis for distinguishing
Canada’s version of review from US style, strong-form (i.e., strongly final) judicial
review.16 By interpreting section 33 as a more or less exhaustive vehicle for interpretive
dialogue under the Charter—when section 33 has almost never been used for that
purpose—dialogue scholars effectively validate, rather than challenge, the obstacles to
Congress or state legislatures in the U.S. overriding
USSC decisions via Article V. Similarly, by arguing that the SCC is not required to show
any deference (under section 1 or internal limitation clauses) to legislative attempts to
engage in dialogue, these scholars also affirm, rather than criticize, the approach of the
USSC towards provisions such as section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For dialogue theory to live up to its original promise of persuading skeptics about
the democratic legitimacy of rights-based review in Canada, a new theory of Charter
dialogue is therefore required.17 The purpose of this article is to develop such a theory.
In the new theory of dialogue offered, the key to “weakening” judicial review in
Canada, relative to that in the United States, will be to insist that the SCC defer to
Parliament or the legislature’s interpretation of the Charter in “second look cases,”
provided that such a deference is reasonable when judged by reference to certain minimal
criteria.18 As a complement to this, dialogue will also require that in second look cases
the SCC stand ready, in cases where it has previously reasoned broadly under the
Charter, to narrow the force of that reasoning ex post, so as to reconcile ex post
deference with its prior precedents. There are several reasons, outlined below, for
adopting such a deference-based approach.
First, it is unrealistic to regard section 33 as a routine vehicle for dialogue, given
both its history and structure. Rather, section 33 should be understood as a valuable
incentive for (and a textual confirmation of the desirability of) the SCC engaging in ex
post deference or narrow statement of this kind. It serves this function by providing
Parliament and the legislature with a residual power to override the SCC, in the event the
SCC fails to show such deference.
Second, a deference-based approach gives the SCC maximum flexibility to
counter blockages in the legislative process that might otherwise impair the enjoyment of
Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635. Perry
advances a theory of judicial “penultimacy” in which “electorally accountable legislators have the last
word” (at 674) and links the theory of penultimate review to concept of dialogue (at 676).
16
Section 1 provides expressly that Parliament or the legislature may impose limits rights as judicially
understood, though subject to certain conditions. Section 33, or the so-called “notwithstanding clause”,
provides that Parliament or the legislature may for a certain period override particular Charter rights,
provided it does so expressly. For further discussion of these provisions, see notes 97-104, infra.
17
Cf. Jeremy Waldron, “Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators” in Grant Huscroft
and Ian Brodie, eds., Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham : LexisNexis Canada, 2004) 7 at 3946 [Waldron, “Models”].
18
Ibid. at 46 (suggesting that “if the Court is never willing to defer … to anyone or anything except past
decisions by the Court, then there is little chance of genuine engagement and dialogue”).
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Charter rights. By preserving scope for the SCC to reason “deeply” in first look cases,
ex post—or “second look”19—deference enhances the SCC’s ability to persuade
Parliament, the legislature, and even the public, to give greater attention or
accommodation to Charter rights.20 By insisting that first look decisions are binding, this
approach also gives the SCC greater ability, than pure weak-form theories of review, to
counter the most persistent forms of legislative inattention to Charter rights claims. The
proposed theory also has the advantage of having a greater degree of fit with existing
Charter history and SCC practice than rival theories.
It may look as though the SCC is being asked to practice two different forms of
review, but as the article explains, this approach to second look decision making should
not be rejected out of a concern for judicial independence. Provided courts are mindful of
its preconditions and rationale, such an approach will be fully compatible with the
maintenance of judicial independence.21 The article also explains that, given the
inevitability of some interpretive uncertainty under the Charter, and the stability created
by a presumption of constitutionality at the second look stage, this theory of ex post
deference and judicial narrow statement does not meaningfully threaten interpretive
consistency or predictability under the Charter. Provided courts are mindful of its
preconditions and rationale, such an approach will be fully compatible with the
maintenance of judicial independence.
This new understanding reveals that the history of dialogue under the Charter to
date has tended both to be more real than skeptics fear and more contingent than dialogue
scholars assure. (That is to say, there has been a higher rate of dialogue than skeptics
admit, but fewer instances and less endorsement of dialogue than advocates claim.)
The most important test of dialogue in new dialogue theory will be whether the
SCC or lower courts are willing in second look cases to actually defer to legislative
sequels evidencing interpretive disagreement with the courts. On this measure, there has
already been a high rate of dialogic success. Another important test will be whether
legislative sequels of this kind enjoy meaningful de facto success. On this criterion, there
have been an even greater number of instances of dialogic success.
19

The distinction between first and second look cases will, of course, be somewhat fluid, given that first
look cases may involve indirect consideration of prior precedents, and second look cases may involve
consideration of new circumstances in addition to prior precedents: See, e.g., JTI-Macdonald, [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199. The distinction, however, is one which both the SCC and commentators have endorsed as
helping to distinguish between circumstances in which the SCC lacks reliable information about the
considered Charter views of Parliament or the legislature on a particular question, from those in which
such information is directly available from recent legislative debate and action. In a scholarly context, see
Hogg and Bushell supra note 2.
20
On the concept of deep reasoning, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on
the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 16-19 (defining “depth” in terms
of the degree to which a judge’s reasons are overtly theoretical or normative)..
21
At most, concerns about judicial independence may imply that some form of delay in the consideration
of second look cases is an additional requirement of successful dialogue, not that the theory of new
dialogue itself should be abandoned: see further note 156-57, infra.
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At the same time, there have been relatively few cases—no more than four at the
SCC level—in which dialogue has truly been tested. This means that it is still premature
to draw firm conclusions about the relative strength or weakness of Charter review by
Canadian courts. Even more important, while generally acting consistently with the
requirements of new dialogue theory, the SCC has not endorsed its premises, such that
the future of dialogue still hangs in the balance.
This article is divided into five parts. Part I outlines the broad contours of current
dialogue theory and explains how it tends largely to endorse, rather than distinguish, US
style, strong-form judicial review. Part II develops the core elements of a new, alternative
theory of dialogue, its prescriptions for section 33 of the Charter as a vehicle for
dialogue, its advantages over rival theories, and its answers to potential criticisms. Part III
reassesses the record of dialogue under the Charter to date, in light of the understandings
of what constitutes new dialogue, set out the preceding parts. Part IV concludes by
considering the preconditions for, and therefore the contingency of, new dialogue under
the Charter in the future.
I.

DIALOGUE, DEMOCRACY AND THE UNITED STATES AS A COMPARATOR

In comparative constitutional scholarship on judicial review, the United States is
generally understood as the archetypical model of strong-form—or final—judicial
review.22This is not because Congress or state legislatures consistently defer to the
USSC’s interpretations of the Constitution or decline to re-enact legislation struck down
for inconsistency with the Constitution.23 Like their Canadian counterparts, it is common
practice for Congress and the state legislatures to respond to USSC decisions that
invalidate their legislation for inconsistency.24 For example, Justice Mitchell Pickerill has
shown that between 1954 and 1997, Congress responded to USSC decisions at a rate of
sixty-two per cent.25 In only a small minority of those instances did Congress repeal the
prior legislation, with the result that in almost fifty per cent of cases, it chose to reenact
its statutory policy.26 Notwithstanding this practice on the part of American
legislatures,the reason the U.S. is considered to embody a system of strong-form judicial
review is that Congress and state legislatures in the U.S, face a number of obstacles to
success, when they seek to engage in “dialogue” of this kind..27
22

See Stephen Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2001) 49 Am. J.
Comp. L. 707 at 709-10; Mark Tushnet, “New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and
Democracy-Based Worries” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813 at 814 [Tushnet, “New Forms”].
23
See Barry Friedman, “Dialogue and Judicial Review” (1992-1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 [Friedman,
“Dialogue”]; Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
24
Ibid. [both]
25
J. Mitchell Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a
Separated System (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004) at 42.
26
Ibid.
27
See Devins and Fisher, supra note 23; Friedman, “Dialogue,” supra note 23.
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Substantial formal legal barriers under Article V of the US Constitution deter
Congress or state legislatures from formally overriding a decision of the Supreme Court.
Constitutional amendments require the support of a two-thirds majority of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate, and ratification by three-fourths of the states.28 As the
size of the House, Senate, and number of states in the United States have increased, this
requirement has become increasingly onerous.29 In recent decades, even proposed
amendments enjoying a high degree of popular support—such as the Equal Rights
Amendment (which would have inserted an express guarantee of equal protection on the
grounds of gender into the Fourteenth Amendment)—have failed. In only one instance
during the twentieth century, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Oregon v.
Mitchell (A.G.),30 has Congress succeeded in initiating a constitutional amendment in
order to modify the effect of a Supreme Court decision.31 Mitchell also involved a
question of federalism, or Congress’s power to prescribe the minimum voting age for
state elections, rather than (at least most directly) an issue of constitutional rights parallel
to those involving interpretation of the Charter.
Another, more contingent reason for the strong degree of finality enjoyed by the
USSC in its interpretation of the Constitution is that the Court itself has consistently
insisted upon broad and exclusive authority to determine the meaning of constitutional
rights, even in the face of dialogue by Congress. For example, in United States v.
Eichman,32 the Court considered the Flag Protection Act,33 enacted following the Court’s
decision in Texas v. Johnson,34 which struck down an earlier flag burning prohibition.
The Court rejected the argument that there was a clear “‘national consensus’ favoring a
prohibition on flag-burning” because “any suggestion that the Government’s interest in
suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is
foreign to the First Amendment.”35
In (City of) Boerne v. Flores,36 the Court again held that only the USSC had the
authority to interpret, rather than enforce, the meaning of the Constitution. The issue

28

U.S. Const. art V.
Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden, “Amending the Constitution: Article V and The Effect of Voting
Rule Inflation” (NBER, Working Paper, 2009).
30
400 U.S. 112 (1970) [Oregon].
31
Pickerill, supra note 25 at 47-48. Three earlier instances, of dialogue via Art V, involved the adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment in response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. 419 (1793); the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as a response to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
(18 How.) 393 (1857); and the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in response to Pollack v. Farmers’
Loan and Trust Co., 400 U.S. 112 (1970). See discussion in Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment
Process, and the Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 11 Harv. J. L. & Pol’y 67 (1998).
32
496 U.S. 310 (1990) [Eichman].
33
18 U.S.C. §700 (1989). (I
34
491 U.S. 397 (1989) [Texas].
35
Eichman, supra note 29 at 318.
36
521 U.S. 507 (1997) [Boerne].
29
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there conceived the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,37 which was a response to
Employment Division v. Smith.38 It ruled:
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot
be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the
power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing
would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment].”39
More recently, in Dickerson v. United States,40 the USSC invalidated an attempt
by Congress to modify the effect of the per se exclusionary rule, established by its earlier
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.41
When it comes to attempts by state officials to engage in dialogue, the USSC has
been even more insistent on its exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution. In
Cooper v. Aaron,42 in the context of violent disputes about the implementation of a
school desegregation order in Arkansas, the Court insisted on the importance of executive
compliance with court orders as an important dimension to the rule of law. Furthermore,
it also insisted on the general supremacy of the Court’s interpretation of the constitution
over competing legislative and executive interpretations. Specifically, Chief Justice
Warren declared that, since Marbury v. Madison,43 judicial supremacy had been “a
permanent and indispensable feature of [the US] constitutional system” and that “[n]o
state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the [Court’s interpretation
of the] Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”44
Equally famous is Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey45 and the
question of whether or to what extent to overrule Roe v. Wade.46 There, a plurality of the
USSC held that legislative attempts to narrow the scope of Roe pointed against, rather
than in favour of, the Court revisiting its abortion decisions.47 As deference could be
interpreted by the public as “surrendering to political pressure,” the Court should be less,

37

42 USC. §2000bb (1993).
494 U.S. 872 (1990) [Smith].
39
Boerne, supra note 33 at 519.
40
530 U.S. 428 (2000) [Dickerson].
41
384 U.S. 436 (1966) at 444 (per Chief Justice Warren) [Miranda]. (ruling that “the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant,” unless it could demonstrate that a person had been “warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed”).).
42
358 U.S. 1 (1958) [Cooper].
43
5 U.S. 137 (1803) [Marbury].
44
Cooper, supra note 45 at 18
45
505 U.S. 833 (1992) [Casey].
46
410 U.S. 113 (1973) [Roe].
47
Casey, supra note 48 at 867-869
38
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not more, willing in such a watershed case to revisit its interpretation of the
Constitution.48
The USSC’s rigid, three-tiered approach to the standard of review also reinforces
the system of strong-form judicial review in the United States. Where laws violate
fundamental rights or fundamental interests under the equal protection clause, or are
based on a suspect classification (such as a classification based on race), the Court
applies strict scrutiny—or asks whether a law is substantially narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling government interest.49 Where a law imposes a time, manner, or
place restriction, or another content-neutral restriction on the enjoyment of a fundamental
right, or where a law is based on a quasi-suspect classification (such as gender), the Court
applies intermediate scrutiny—or asks whether a law is substantially narrowly tailored to
advance an important government objective.50 In all other cases, the Court applies a
rational basis review, which asks whether a law has some rational connection to a
legitimate government purpose.51
The consequence of this three-tiered approach is that the USSC must apply the
same approach to any legislative sequel—or second look case—as it did in its first look.
While individual justices can always “gloss” over the requirements of strict scrutiny, such
scrutiny clearly requires that legislation not unduly infringe the enjoyment of
constitutional rights previously recognized by the Court in order to be valid.52 This, in
turn, makes it more difficult for individual justices simultaneously to follow the Court’s
own precedents and show deference to legislative Constitutional judgments, even if they
favor doing so to uphold a congressional sequel.
Canadian scholars suggest that, by reason of the Charter’s distinctive features,
judicial review in Canada is “weaker” than in the United States.53 Compared to Article V
of the US Constitution, section 33 of the Charter provides a relatively undemanding
mechanism by which Parliament or the legislature may override the effect of an SCC
decision interpreting the Charter. At any given time, reliance by Parliament or the
provincial legislatures on section 33 simply requires an express declaration and the
support of a legislative majority.54 After five years, Parliament or the provincial
48

Ibid at 867
See, e.g.,, Harper v Virginia State Board of Elections 383 US 663 (1966) (voting as fundamental
interest); Casey supra note 43 (reproductive privacy as fundamental right); Johnson v. California, 543 U.
S. 499 (2005) (race-based classifications).
50
See, e.g.,,Heffron v International Society for Krishna Consciousness 452 US 640 (1981) (time,
manner, and/orplace restrictions); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (content-neutrality test);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (gender discrimination).
51
See, e.g.,, Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma 348 US 483 (1955).
52
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and discussion in Marisa Lopez, “Constitutional
Law: Lowering the Standard of Strict Scrutiny” (2004) 56 Fla. L. Rev. 841.
53
See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, “Constitutional Dialogue Under a Bill of Rights” (2007-2008) 23 N.J.C.L.
127 at 134 [Hogg, “Bill of Rights”].
54
Charter, supra note 1, s. 33(1). (providing that Parliament or the legislature may provide that
legislation shall operate notwithstanding s. 2, or ss. 7-15).
49
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legislatures must re-enact the legislation to re-engage the override.55 Section 33 of the
Charter, dialogue scholars therefore argue, creates a “big difference between Canada and
the United States.”56 Compared to the various provisions of the US Bill of Rights,57 which
make no express provision for the limitation of rights, section 1 of the Charter also alters
the way in which the SCC approaches the assessment of the proportionality or
justifiability of limitations on rights.58
On closer inspection, however, the way in which dialogue scholars interpret the
significance of provisions such as sections 33 and 1 means that, in the vast majority of
cases, their theory actually provides little basis for distinguishing the legitimacy of US
style, strong-form judicial review. When it comes to section 33 of the Charter, dialogue
scholars generally argue that it should be understood to exhaust, not confirm, the scope
for true interpretive dialogue between courts and legislatures under the Charter.59 Thus,
in the context of section 1 of the Charter (or an equivalent clause-specific limitation),
dialogue scholars claim that legislatures are not free to engage in dialogue about the
meaning of the Charter itself, but only about the way in which the Charter relates to
particular policy objectives.
In this context It is for the courts, Hogg and Bushell argue in their 1997 article
Charter Dialogue, to interpret the meaning of Charter rights and for legislatures to
respect “the Charter values … identified by the [c]ourt[s],” while continuing to pursue
their prior policy objectives.60 In Charter Dialogue Revisited, Hogg, Bushell, and Wright
make even more explicit this division of responsibility between courts and legislatures.
Under their view, while legislatures remain responsible for determining how to achieve
social and economic policy objectives, they “may not act on an interpretation of the
Charter which conflicts with an interpretation provided by the courts.”61 Other dialogue
scholars, such as Kent Roach, also see dialogue as “an interchange … between judges
and legislators in which the former focus on rights and the latter are allowed to explain
why they believe it is necessary to limit rights in the circumstances.”62
The difficulty for dialogue scholars, given this view of section 33, is that in the
thirty-seven years in which the Charter has been in operation, there has only been one
case in which the notwithstanding clause has been used to override a decision by the SCC
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under the Charter.63 That instance involved the SCC’s decision in Ford v. Quebec
(A.G.),64 and the decision by the Quebec legislature to reinstate a preference for Frenchonly, as opposed to bilingual, signs in the province.65 Parliament has never invoked
section 33 of the Charter, and provincial legislatures have used it only fifteen times in
addition to its usage in connection with Ford. Twelve of those further instances also
involved Quebec.66 Peter Hogg suggests that this is because “public opinion outside
Quebec has not been deeply disturbed by decisions of the Court,” at least when compared
to the USpublic’s reaction to decisions such as Lochner v. New York,67 or Roe.68 The
difficulty with this view, however, is that it tends to imply only the narrowest of
differences between judicial review in Canada and the United States.
Concerns about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in the United States
are far from confined to decisions such as Lochner or Roe, where the USSC adopted a
sweeping view of the due process clause in direct tension with the constitutional
understandings of a large number of Americans.69 Those concerns extend to a much
larger number of decisions in which the USSC has frustrated a national majority in its
interpretation of the constitution.
Nor is it true that the SCC’s Charter decisions have been met with universal
popular approval. Take, for example, the decisions of the SCC in R. v. Seaboyer70 and
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),71 which struck down as incompatible with the
Charter certain respective “rape-shield” and tobacco advertising provisions. In both
cases, the SCC’s decision met strong opposition from women’s groups and public health
organizations, not to mention the public at large.72 This opposition was not limited to the
result, but extended to the Court’s approach to Charter interpretation. In Seaboyer,
women’s groups argued that by failing to recognize the relevance of the complainant’s
equality rights to the justifiability of the provisions under challenge, the SCC took too
narrow a view of the scope of the constitutional value-ordering created by section 15(1)

63

Compare Jamie Cameron, “The Charter’s Legislative Override: Feat or Figment of the Constitutional
Imagination?” in Huscroft and Brodie, supra note 17at 135.
64
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [Ford].
65
See An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54, s. 10 (“Bill 178”).
Thereafter, the Quebec legislature repealed its own attempt at dialogue by passing legislation designed to
give much broader effect to the decision of the SCC in Ford, suggesting that a more narrowly tailored
alternative to French-only signage laws would be laws requiring French to be “present and predominant”
on all signs. See An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1993, c. 40, s. 18 (Bill 86).
66
See Tsvi Kahana, “The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the Ignored
Practice of Section 33 of the Charter” (2001) 44 Can. Pub. Admin. J. 255 at 256-58 [Kahana, “S.33
Practice”].
67
198 U.S. 45 (1905) [Lochner].
68
See Hogg, “Bill of Rights,” supra note 59 at 135.
69
See David A. Strauss, “Why Was Lochner Wrong?” (2003) 70 U. Chicago L. Rev. 373.
70
[1991] 2 S.C.R 577 [Seaboyer].
71
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [RJR-MacDonald].
72
See Janet L. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role? (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2002) at 85, 93 [Hiebert, Charter Conflicts].

11

of the Charter.73 In MacDonald, public health advocates argued that the SCC should not
have treated tobacco advertising as speech or granted tobacco companies the standing to
assert Charter rights.74 In these and other cases, it is difficult to accept, as Hogg suggests,
that the threshold of disagreement was not sufficient to engage section 33.
When it comes to section 1 of the Charter, dialogue scholars have tended to
approach this provision in a way that creates little relevant difference between Canada
and the United States. For the most part, they suggest that the significance of section 1
(and guarantees with internal limitations) is that it discourages an absolutist approach to
the definition of rights.75 If rights are subject to reasonable limits, there is great scope for
dialogue between courts and legislatures about the ways in which rights and policy
objectives should be balanced.76
One difficulty with this approach is that it misconceives its American counterpart.
In fact, there are few areas in which the USSC has adopted anything like an absolutist
approach to the protection of constitutional rights.77 Even in the context of the free
speech clause of the First Amendment, the USSC—with the notable exception of Justices
Black and Douglas—has consistently adopted a non-absolutist approach to the scope of
the guarantee of speech.
A more promising path emphasizes the degree to which section 1 creates greater
“flexibility for legislative sequels than … the American Bill of Rights without a
limitation clause.”78 The Court has also subsequently indicated that these requirements
are to be applied in a context-sensitive way, with proper regard, among other things, to
whether the government is seeking (via particular legislation) to protect vulnerable
groups or otherwise promote Charter values.79 At least as it has been interpreted over the
years, the SCC’s Oakes test represents a significantly more generalized, “floating”
approach to assessing the proportionality of limitations on rights than a US style test of
strict (or even intermediate) scrutiny.80 The second, minimal impairment limb of the
Oakes proportionality requirement is also, in the way it is applied, generally a less
73
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demanding requirement than the equivalent requirement of narrow tailoring (or
substantial narrow tailoring) applied in the United States. This means that when it comes
to assessing the compatibility of a legislative sequel with the Charter, Canadian justices
enjoy greater flexibility than their US counterparts to uphold such sequels, consistent
with their own court’s prior precedents.
It is curious that dialogue theorists do not ultimately permit Canadian justices to
use this flexibility to promote a more dialogic approach to review. Notably, they argue
that courts “should not approach second look cases any differently than they approach
first look cases”81 but are always required to “decide cases according to their view of the
law.”82 Any other approach, Hogg claims, “would be offensive to the judicial function.”83
According to this view, legislative sequels that challenge the SCC’s interpretation of the
Charter will be rendered invalid, unless there is a change in the composition of the Court,
or broader social changes persuade justices to revisit their own prior decisions. This, in
turn, is exactly what happens in the United States—though there is mandatory retirement
for SCC judges, but not for members of the USSC, which tends somewhat to increase
relative turnover on the SCC.84
II.

DIALOGUE AS COMPROMISE: THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFERENCE

For dialogue theory to live up to its promise of distinguishing US style concerns
about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review, a new account of sections 1 and 33—
and of dialogue—is required.
A.

New Dialogue and Deference ( )

In the new account of dialogue, the key to distinguishing Canadian from US style
review will be the understanding that in second look cases, such as those equivalent to
Eichman, Boerne or Dickerson, the SCC should show some degree of deference under
section 1 to the measures adopted by legislators. It also requires that, in order reconcile a
showing of ex post deference with the less deferential approach taken in an earlier case,
the SCC should be willing either to overrule that earlier case or to engaging in a form of
narrow restatement (or narrow statement ex post).
The idea of a narrow judicial statement ex ante is familiar to common law lawyers
in both Canada and the United States as a means by which courts may increase the scope
81
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for legislators to revise the ongoing, practical effect of their decisions. The key benefit to
a narrow statement ex ante, in this context, is that it signals clearly to Parliament and the
provincial legislatures that there is space to adopt a different interpretation of the Charter
in future cases.
The idea of narrow statement ex post builds on this idea by asking members of
the SCC to apply that concept to a second look case. In other words, they would uphold a
legislative sequel under a narrow statement of the first look decision as both reasonable
and also consistent that decision. But if the legislative sequel could not be saved by a
narrow statement of the earlier decision, the first look decision would prevail. Narrow
restatement of this kind will also have a central role to play, in new dialogue theory,
because overruling a decision will generally be unnecessary (and therefore undesirable),
given that the SCC’s interpretation of the Charter was itself premised—at least
implicitly—on the understanding that a legislative sequel might take the form of a
disagreement with the SCC decision.85
The main reason, in new dialogue theory, for insisting on such ex post deference
under section 1 is that section 33 does not provide a realistic alternative avenue for
ordinary, as opposed to extraordinary, interpretive dialogue.86
One reason for this is the historic link between the use of section 33 and Quebec’s
demands for recognition as a “distinct society.” Not only did the first remedial use of
section 33 occur in this context,87 but, as many other commentators have noted, in both
instances the Quebec legislature relied on section 33 in a way which was both widely
noticed and deeply unpopular in the rest of Canada.88 Quebec’s use of the override was
an important factor in the Meech Lake Accord, which recognized Quebec as a “distinct
society” within Canada.89 Subsequent use of the power has also, for most Canadians,
simply confirmed the link between section 33 and Quebec’s demands to be treated as a
distinct society, exempt from broader Canadian constitutional commitments, thereby
making it extremely costly for Parliament and anglophone legislatures to contemplate
using section 33 as a means of engaging in dialogue.90
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Even if this history did not exist, section 33 would still be an unlikely vehicle for
routine legislative dialogue under new dialogue theory. By creating a broad power to
override Charter rights, section 33 provides legislators with a natural vehicle for setting
limits on the extent to which rights apply to particular cases or circumstances—or for
expressing what Jeremy Waldron has called “misgivings” about the application of
rights.91 It provides a much less natural vehicle by which Parliament or the legislature can
express disagreement with the SCC about the content or priority of Charter rights in
particular, concrete circumstances (“rights disagreements”).92 In such cases, if Parliament
or the legislature is to invoke section 33 in aid of dialogue, it will be required to some
degree to misrepresent the nature and scope of its disagreement with the SCC. By making
legislators seem less trustworthy, misrepresentation of this kind will also tend to make it
far more difficult for legislators to persuade the public that in seeking to engage in
dialogue it is motivated by principled disagreement with the SCC, and not just pure
political expediency. This, in turn, can mean that the political price of dialogue for
Parliament or the legislatur exceeds the benefits it perceives to achieving a more
democratic and responsive Charter outcome.
For this reason, new dialogue theory holds that, while section 33 of the Charter
will be important to dialogue, its role will tend to be largely background in nature. The
most important function of section 33 will be to give the SCC greater incentive to adhere
to a commitment to ex post deference.
Given the simple mechanism for applying section 33, if the SCC declines to defer
to Parliament or the legislature in second look cases, there is at least some prospect that
Parliament or the legislature will decide wholly to override the Court’s interpretation of
the Charter in favour of its own preferred interpretation.93 If members of the SCC are in
any way “constitutional maximizers,” they will have much greater incentive than justices
in the United States to defer to legislative sequels which take some account of their
preferred constitutional vision.94 If they show such deference, they can be fairly confident
that their preferred Charter interpretation will have some influence. If they strike down
Parliament’s or the legislature’s attempt at dialogue, they run a risk, not only of losing
influence in a particular area of Charter interpretation, but also of losing influence more
generally, in the eyes of the public. If members of the Court are at all risk averse about
constitutional outcomes, they will have a clear incentive to defer to reasonable legislative
91
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sequels. By contrast, members of the USSC have every incentive in second look cases to
insist upon their own uniquely preferred interpretation of the constitution because the
chances of reversal are smaller.
A second important function of section 33 in new dialogue theory will be to
provide valuable textual confirmation to the SCC of the desirability of adopting a
commitment to ex post deference under the Charter. In this sense, section 33 will serve
much the same function vis à vis section 1 (and other internal limitation clauses) as
section 15(2) of the Charter does in respect of section 15(1)— i.e., provide a helpful cue
to the SCC to prefer one interpretation of the nature and structure of particular Charter
provisions over another.95 Admittedly, it will not provide a perfect textual cue to the SCC
in this context, given its connection to the idea of rights misgivings as opposed to rights
disagreements and its potential to be read as either confirming or exhausting the proper
scope for dialogue under the Charter. However, section 33 will again have much in
common with parallel provisions, such as section 15(2), which have also been interpreted
by the SCC to involve some potential ambiguity.96 Therefore, while the notwithstanding
clause cannot ensure that a justice will adopt a particular, preferred dialogic approach to
the process of justification under section 1, it can, like section 15(2), provide valuable
textual support for a justice adopting such an approach if she or he deems it desirable.
A related function section 33 serves, in this context, is to confirm to the SCC that
the deference required of it in second look cases is not unlimited. The precise limits
which apply to ex post deference many not exactly mirror the limits to section 33, but
they will tend to be closely parallel. By itself, the existence of some limits in the latter
context will also tend to provide valuable additional confirmation, to the SCC, that there
should also be some limits in the former.
One such limit, for example, will be the requirement a legislative sequel is within
the outer bounds of reasonable interpretations of the Charter (or, is not patently
unreasonable). This reflects the fact that strong-form judicial review is problematic to the
extent that there is scope for reasonable disagreement among Canadians about what the
text, history, and normative values underpinning the Charter entail in particular cases.
The moment such disagreement ceases to be reasonable according to any plausible
interpretive theory, democratic objections to the SCC having final authority to interpret
the Charter according to that theory also disappear.
A second limit stems from the understanding that, ideally, norms of interpretive
deference should be reciprocated between the courts and the legislatures. This helps to
ensure that, where the public favours some form of compromise between competing
Charter values (or public rights and policy concerns), the path to achieving such a
95
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compromise is as smooth as possible. Absent a norm of mutual deference between judges
and legislators, the path to long-term constitutional stability will tend to involve sharp
swings between differing judicial and legislative constitutional interpretations, pending
the ultimate “resolution” of such disagreement by Canadians via electoral or other means.
The legislative branch could consistently pass the most extreme, “in your face”
legislative sequels, which have effect for some period of time, and the SCC could
consistently strike-down those statutes, thereby restoring the legal status quo, pending
passage of another sequel.97 This type of behaviour undermines legal stability and
predictability in a way which is neither necessary nor desirable from a dialogic
perspective. As a result, dialogue theory favours a more controlled process of interpretive
exchange under the Charter, whereby both judges and legislators commit to modify
wherever possible, rather than wholly disregard, the interpretations of the other branch.98
B.

New Dialogue, Judicial Minimalism, and Charter Conversation Compared

By emphasizing the importance of judicial deference and narrow statement ex
post under section 1 of the Charter, new dialogue theory gives Canadian courts
maximum flexibility ex ante to counter blockages in the legislative process that might
otherwise impair the enjoyment of Charter rights.99
I have suggested elsewhere that reasonable disagreement about the meaning of
constitutional rights means that, in most cases, a court such as the SCC cannot
legitimately seek to enforce a wholly freestanding historical or moral conception of
Charter rights. This does not mean, however, that the Court’s role under the Charter is
necessarily insignificant, given the range of potential blockages in the legislative process
surrounding the protection of Charter rights.100 Because legislative processes in Canada
97
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are frequently subject to blockages, such as those caused by “blind spots” and “burdens
of inertia,” Canadians will often be prevented from enjoying even those Charter rights
that a majority of citizens would be willing to grant them, if asked.101
Legislative blind spots alone can take at least three distinct forms. They can relate
to the application of laws to particular cases in a way that limits rights (blind spots of
application), to certain perspectives not directly represented in the legislature (blind spots
of perspective), and to opportunities for low-cost accommodation of rights claims (blind
spots of accommodation). Each form of blind spot will arise for somewhat different
reasons, having to do with constraints on the time, expertise, diversity, and focus of
legislators.
Blind spots of application will often arise simply as a result of time constraints on
legislators. When legislators are required to consider hundreds of bills in any given
session, as well as perform constituency-related functions, they will often lack time to
study individual pieces of legislation in detail. In other cases, blind spots of application
can arise even where legislators do turn their minds to a particular issue, because
legislators, like all of us, are subject to forms of bounded rationality and will therefore
have limited foresight about the full range of circumstances in which a law may impair
rights in the future.
Blind spots of perspective will arise in Canadian legislatures wherever a group
lacks “descriptive” representation in the legislature and legislators lack the appropriate
incentive or mechanism for reaching out to these excluded voices.102 In some cases,
limits of this kind will be the product of deliberate, formal restrictions on the franchise
(such as those that exist in the case of non-citizens and which used to exist for
prisoners.)103 In other cases, they will be the product of electoral dynamics. As a result,
political parties will have little incentive to select a diverse range of candidates with
perspectives very different to those of the median voter. In each case, legislators will
often have limited incentive to engage with the arguments and experiences of such
groups, and, in any event, will find that they have few institutional opportunities for such
engagement.
Blind spots of accommodation, in turn, can arise in legislative processes as a
consequence of limits on both the time and expertise of legislators. Such limitations often
lead legislators to delegate the task of identifying appropriate rights protections to the
minister responsible for particular legislation, or to a legislative sub-committee, even
when these legislators themselves often lack the experience necessary to craft appropriate
rights protections. They also tend to have a disproportionate interest in achieving the
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101
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relevant legislative objective in a way that can lead them to overlook opportunities for the
accommodation of rights, even if such accommodations represent only a minimal cost on
the legislature’s policy aims.104
In many cases, legislative blind spots can also intersect with subsequent
legislative inertia in a way that prevents the ongoing correction of earlier oversights.
Inertia of this kind can take at least three distinct forms and impede legislative
responsiveness to broader changes in constitutional understandings. Legislative burdens
of inertia can be the product of competing legislative priorities (priority-driven inertia),
competing factions within political parties in the legislature (coalition-driven inertia), and
bureaucratic delay on the part of the executive, combined with poor oversight by
legislatures (compound inertia). Priority-driven inertia can arise because capacity
constraints on legislatures, at both levels of government, cause legislators to prioritize
demands for action that benefit a large number of citizens and to neglect the demands of
minorities, even where those demands find tacit support from a much larger majority.
Coalition-driven forms of inertia can arise in a different set of circumstances,
where legislative behaviour is dominated by partisan political considerations. Against
such a background, divisions within political parties over a Charter issue (may cause)
legislators to avoid addressing that issue, even where there is fairly clear majority support
for legislative change in the broader constitutional culture. In Canada, as in most
constitutional democracies, affiliation with a major political party is extremely important
to legislators’ chances of election; legislators, therefore, have a strong interest in
promoting both the actual and apparent coherence of their party. That coherence can also
be threatened where a Charter issue divides a party internally. In these circumstances,
party leaders face two broad options: either allow a free vote among party members on
the basis of their conscience, or impose party discipline on members in the minority. Both
options can have costs for the coherence of the party. Allowing a conscience vote can
undermine the public perception of solidarity, but imposing party discipline can erode the
internal cohesion of a party; if such discipline is imposed frequently enough, members of
a minority faction may no longer feel it is in their interest to remain part of the broad,
party-based coalition.105 Faced with this catch-22, legislators may therefore decide to
keep an issue off the agenda—even in the face of demands for legal change from the
broader constitutional culture.106 The strategic question is whether the short-term
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electoral gains of greater legislative responsiveness outweigh the damage to party
coherence.
Alternatively, compound forms of inertia have the potential to arise wherever the
realization of a Charter right requires some form of positive action from the executive.
Where this is the case, time constraints, competing priorities, and defiance on the part of
executive officials can mean that changes that advance rights are substantially delayed.107
Legislatures, with their own competing priorities, can fail to counter or punish such
bureaucratic inertia where it arises. However, none of these blockages need be
insurmountable, in a constitutional system such as Canada’s, which provides for broad
judicial review.
All Canadian courts, not merely the SCC, will be well placed to identify
blockages, such as those caused by blind spots of application. The fact that Canadian
courts generally hear cases on a concrete, case-by-case basis means that they have ample
opportunity to consider the application of laws to particular circumstances. Judges at
higher levels of appeal will also, by virtue of prior experience in practice or in lower
courts, be highly skilled at identifying the kinds of procedural protection or narrow
substantive exceptions to laws which could be adopted at low cost to a particular
legislative objective, thereby overcoming existing blind spots of accommodation. When it
comes to burdens of inertia, appellate judges in particular will also have a range of
sources available to them—domestic and foreign—which can help them identify the
degree of popular support for a particular Charter claim.108 Given their powers under the
Charter, Canadian courts will also have a broad range of tools available to them with
which to counter such blockages, once identified.
The coercive remedial powers Canadian courts enjoy by virtue of section 24(1) of
the Charter gives them the direct ability to counter almost all forms of legislative blind
spot, simply by striking down or modifying the effect of legislation in a particular case.109
These powers also mean that, compared to purely political interventions made by social
movements or human rights commissions, judicial interventions in the name of the
Charter provide legislators with a greater incentive to address a previously neglected
issue. (If they do not, it is likely that courts themselves will address the issue in a way
legislators find less appealing.) The communicative aspect of courts’ reasoning also gives
courts an extremely valuable additional tool with which to counter both legislative blind
spots and burdens of inertia: appellate courts, and particularly the SCC, generally allow
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provide much readier access to national media attention for rights claimants, than do
direct, popular attempts at constitutional change.110 In doing so, they provide a powerful
tool for countering both blind spots of perspective and coalition-driven forms of inertia.
Different approaches to weakening the finality of the SCC’s interpretations of the
Charter, however, imply varying degrees of constraint on the capacity of the SCC to use
these tools with a view to countering such blockages. As a logical matter, there are two
predominant ways, other than via ex post deference, by which the Court could weaken
the finality of its decisions without Parliament or the legislature resorting to the
application of section 33. One option would be for the SCC to adopt a much narrower
approach to the scope of judicial review ex ante. Another option would be for it to accept
that Parliament and the provincial legislatures may disregard its decision, or treat it as
lacking binding force.111 The first option is generally associated with theories of “judicial
minimalism,” proposed by scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Patrick Monahan in the
United States and Canada, respectively.112 In the United States, the second option is
associated with the idea of departmentalism,113 while in the United Kingdom it is
connected to the idea of judicial review as “conversation.”114
Theoretically, all three approaches are capable of responding to the possibility
that, in seeking to counter perceived legislative blockages, Canadian courts may
sometimes misjudge the degree of democratic support for, or practical effect of,
recognizing a Charter right. Especially when compared to the predominant understanding
of judicial review in the United States, each approach ensures that decisions of the SCC
are at least fairly open to revision by Parliament or the legislature. The advantages of new
dialogue theory are that it preserves the maximum scope possible for review ex ante,
thereby countering blockages in the legislative process, and adopts a more deferential
position ex post.
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Compared to judicial minimalism, new dialogue theory gives Canadian courts
much greater flexibility in first look cases to determine whether to engage in broad versus
narrow (and therefore also shallow versus deep) forms of reasoning ex ante.115 By doing
so, it gives courts greater ability to use persuasion as a tool for promoting the enjoyment
of rights. In many cases, persuasion of this kind will allow courts to address legislative
blockages, such as those caused by blind spots of perspective and accommodation, or
priority-driven burdens of inertia. Blockages of this kind will often arise in a consistent,
closely-related pattern across different settings. Court decisions that seek to counter such
blockages via case-specific, coercive means will tend to leave undisturbed a large number
of other statutes embodying parallel blockages. In contrast, those that persuade legislators
to give increased attention to a particular rights argument, concern, or issue—in more
systemic terms—are likely to have a much broader impact on overall blind spots or
inertia of this kind.116
In comparison to conversational and departmental theories, new dialogue theory
gives Canadian courts greater capacity to address legislative blockages, particularly those
caused by the most persistent coalition-driven and compound inertia. Unlike
conversational theories that limit the courts’ review choices, new dialogue theory gives
courts broad power—through remedies—to directly counter such inertia.117 In the face of
such inertia, it allows them to create a new, more democratically responsive legal
equilibrium with the expectation that, unless the Court clearly misjudges democratic
constitutional understandings, this new equilibrium will endure for some period of time.
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Unlike departmental theory, new dialogue theory also gives Canadian courts
much broader capacity to indirectly counter such inertia by further insisting that whatever
remedial orders courts do issue, such orders should be treated as (at least narrowly)
binding against both legislators and executive officials. It ensures that, whether courts
issue a suspended declaration of invalidity or a mandatory injunction setting a time frame
for legislative or executive action, the court’s intervention necessarily alters the
incentives facing legislators when deciding whether to address a particularly
controversial or complex Charter issue. Without a binding time frame for addressing
such an issue, legislators with competing priorities or strong internal disagreements will
have little reason to give increased attention to a particular issue. But when such a
timeframe is backed by the threat of legislative invalidation or contempt of court, judicial
intervention will create strong incentives for at least some legislators with a particular
interest in or responsibility for an issue.
Another argument for new dialogue theory over rival minimalist, conversational,
or departmental approaches is that this approach fits more easily within the structure of
the Charter, as well as the actual history of Charter review in Canada.118 In the United
States, there is some historical support for departmental understandings, given that it is
far from clear that the framers of the Constitution intended to establish judicial
supremacy, at least at the expense of Congress. Furthermore, as Larry Kramer has shown,
there was also a long period in the nineteenth century during which the president,
Congress and state officials actively exercised their “departmental” authority to interpret
the Constitution.119
In the United Kingdom, where conversational theories have gained the most
attention, defining the Court’s role in purely communicative terms also makes some
sense at the level of fit, given the constraints of the Human Rights Act 1998.120 Section 3
of the HRA provides that British courts have an obligation “so far as it is possible to do
so” to “read and giv[e] effect” to legislation “in a way which is compatible with the
Convention rights.” Section 4 provides that where a compatible reading is impossible,
courts may make a “declaration of incompatibility.” Such a declaration does not, in turn,
“affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of
which it is given, and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is
made.”121 As a result, a section 4 declaration may plausibly be considered conversational,
rather than legally binding.
By contrast, due to Canada’s history and the structure of the Charter, it is less
appropriate to treat Canadian courts’ decisions as lacking binding legal force. By the time
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the Charter was adopted in 1982, it was accepted that court decisions are legally binding
against other branches of government, at least in the narrow sense that other branches
must respect courts’ decisions as the final word on the rights and liabilities of individual
parties before them, rather than the more general legal issues raised by a case.122 Section
52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, empowers Canadian courts to invalidate
unconstitutional legislation. Therefore, it also makes less sense to treat Canadian courts’
role as primarily persuasive or communicative, rather than coercive.123
If one considers the SCC’s approach to Charter review since 1982, it is clear that
members of the Court have frequently departed from a strictly minimalist, narrow, and
shallow approach to judicial reasoning ex ante. Take the approach of the SCC in cases in
which it invalidates a law for inconsistency with section 1 of the Charter. Truly narrow
reasoning in such cases would involve an exclusive focus by the SCC on the minimal
impairment limb of the Oakes test (i.e., the question of whether a law limited a protected
right as little as possible). Unlike a finding that a law lacked an appropriately important
objective or failed the rational basis test, such a finding would not in any way suggest
that Parliament or the legislature was precluded from re-enacting closely the measure.
Similarly, unlike a finding about ultimate proportionality, such a finding would also
avoid comment on what would be required for legislation to pass muster in a second look
situation.
The SCC, however, has rarely chosen to rely exclusively on this limb of the
Oakes test. While the minimal impairment test has been critical, the Court has also
emphasized multiple bases of potential invalidity when striking down legislation.
Between 1986 and 1997, Leon E. Trakman, William Cole-Hamilton, and Sean Gatien
found that in nine per cent and sixteen per cent of cases, respectively, the SCC found that
the legislation not only failed minimal impairment, but also the requirements of rational
connection and proportionality.124 At a more qualitative level, the SCC’s section 1
reasoning is at times overtly normative and, to that degree, somewhat broad, even when
ostensibly connected to the idea of minimal impairment itself.125
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From this perspective, an approach that emphasizes the desirability of giving the
SCC flexibility to determine when and how much to engage in narrow statement ex post,
as opposed to ex ante, will therefore also have clear advantages when it comes to
considerations of fit.
III.

OBJECTIONS TO JUDICIAL DEFERENCE EX POST

Two main objections may be raised to the idea of judicial deference, or narrow
statement, ex post: one is that an approach of this kind on the part of the SCC has the
potential to undermine interpretive stability—or consistency—at a lower court level,
when the constitutional status of a legislative sequel is in issue.126 Another objection is
that deference of this kind is contrary to the independence of the judiciary, which is an
unwritten constitutional principle.127 However, while both point to valid concerns, neither
provides a persuasive basis for rejecting, at least out of hand, the desirability of new
dialogue theory as a preferred account of the balance between the SCC and Parliament or
the legislature under the Charter.
When it comes to concerns about interpretive stability, it is important to recognize
that whatever approach the SCC adopts, some degree of interpretive inconsistency is
inevitable.128 It is predictable that lower courts will apply the SCC jurisprudence in
different ways and arrive at different outcomes. In the case of legislative sequels, lower
courts are also likely to apply a strong presumption of constitutionality—which in effect
mirrors the consequences of the SCC applying ex post deference—in a way that creates
little difference between these and other cases.
Take the pattern exhibited in lower court decisions in the period between the
SCC’s decision in Seaboyer and its subsequent decision in R. v. Darrach,129 which
considered whether Parliament’s new rape-shield law violated the Charter. In a number
of cases during this period, the defendant wished to present evidence not addressed by the
SCC in Seaboyer—evidence of a complainant’s prior, nonconsensual sexual activity. In
determining the admissibility of such evidence, especially prior to the SCC’s decision in
R. v. Crosby,130 the lower courts were guided by the SCC’s interpretation of the purpose
of the rape-shield regime discussed in Seaboyer. According to the Court, its obligation
was to prevent juries from being distracted by evidence that suggested that a complainant
was either more likely to consent to sexual intercourse, or less likely to be credible, by
126
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reason of her prior sexual activity (the “twin myths”).131 For the most part, the lower
courts had difficulty with this issue and were inconsistent in the approach they took in
this area.132
In cases more directly parallel to Seaboyer, where applying the legislative sequel
required consideration of whether the SCC was likely to defer to (and uphold) such
legislation, lower courts arguably adopted a more consistent approach. Unless asked to do
so, they did not question the validity of the relevant amended legislation, but instead
applied a presumption in favour of validity. By carefully considering the SCC’s guidance
in Seaboyer about the twin myths—to which such legislation responded—the lower
courts consistently identified certain categories of cases (such as those involving
children’s evidence) where the rape-shield regime was inapplicable.133 They also
managed, when applying the Criminal Code,134 to balance the probative value versus the
prejudice of particular evidence in a fairly consistent way.135 If the SCC had made it even
clearer at the first look stage, in Seaboyer, that it favoured a commitment to ex post
deference and narrow statement, lower courts would also very likely have approached
these cases in an even more consistent way..
The SCC has itself made clear, in the context of section 1, that there will often be
a need to “nuance” the application of the Oakes test and give what amounts to deference
to the legislature in an attempt to balance competing Charter values.136 Post 11
September 2001, in the national security context in particular, the SCC held that it is
appropriate for courts to show heightened deference to Parliament, and by extension the
executive, in assessing whether a violation of Charter rights can be justified.137 Other
courts, including the USSC and House of Lords, have endorsed similar principles of
deference, or a similar “margin of discretionary judgment,” in the context of cases
involving questions of foreign affairs, immigration, and national security.138 It therefore
131
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cannot be that any form of deference by courts to legislative constitutional judgments is
antithetical to principles of judicial independence. The question must be one of degree,
rather than kind. As a matter of degree, narrow judicial restatement will require deference
by Canadian courts of only a limited kind.
Under this principle, in determining whether to defer to a reasonable legislative
sequel, Canadian courts will still be required to make a number of important substantive
findings. First, they must decide whether a legislative sequel is reasonable in light of the
basic constitutional commitment to freedom and democracy in section 1 of the Charter;
and, second, they must determine whether it is reasonable in light of their own prior
judgments. In either instance, rather than suspending its own judgment, the Court will be
required to make complex evaluative judgments about the nature of both prior judicial
and prior legislative reasoning.
On this point, the history of Darrach is instructive. In Seaboyer, (the first look
case) a majority held that the rape-shield regime in section 276 of the Criminal Code
imposed an unjustifiable limitation on an accused’s rights under sections 7 and 11(d) of
the Charter. One reason was that the scheme was both unduly rigid and substantially
overbroad in its approach, and failed to exclude only irrelevant evidence (i.e., evidence
going to the advancement of the twin myths). Parliament responded in a way partially
compliant with this reasoning—i.e., it enacted a new regime, giving discretion to judges
to admit evidence of the kind considered in Seaboyer, that is, “relevant, specific in nature,
and [which has] significant probative value which is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of prejudice to the administration of justice.”139 However, Parliament also sought
to narrow the extent to which the Seaboyer would lead to the admission of such evidence
(even if was plausibly, but minimally, relevant), by introducing additional requirements
of specificity and significance.140
In Darrach, the SCC upheld this new law by, in effect, engaging in a form of
narrow restatement. Rather than insisting on a broad reasoning of its prior decision in
Seaboyer, it emphasized two of its specific concerns in Seaboyer. First was the way the
legislative sequel addressed the blanket nature of the prohibition and its pigeon-hole
approach to relevance in the earlier, problematic provision. Second was Darrach’s
decision to downplay Seaboyer’s broader reasoning about the irrelevance of particular
legislative objectives (such as increasing the willingness of complainants to report sexual
assault) and the need to prioritize the accused’s right of full answer and defence by
admitting all potentially relevant and probative evidence that did not have the potential to
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cause substantial prejudice.141 Furthermore, the complainant’s privacy played a different
role in the analyses; in Darrach, the Court held that excluding evidence of a
complainant’s sexual history could legitimately be considered to further the “proper
administration of justice.”142 In upholding the legislation as consistent with the
requirements of fundamental justice, Darrach also held that it was legitimate for
Parliament to “direct judges to the serious ramifications of the use of evidence of prior
sexual activity for all parties to these cases.”143
Therefore, in Darrach, the Court engaged in its own independent, evaluative
judgment about the reasonableness of the legislation. Before deciding to uphold the
sequel, it gave careful consideration to the degree to which Parliament had avoided an
overly rigid, pigeon-hole approach to admissibility, and also applied a balancing
approach to determine the admissibility of evidence, as endorsed by Seaboyer.144 The
SCC specifically held that by requiring evidence to have significant probative value in
order to be admissible, Parliament had not raised the “threshold for admissibility to the
point that it [was] unfair to the accused.”145 The Court also considered the
reasonableness, in a more independent sense, of Parliament seeking to exclude evidence
of prior sexual history adduced to support inferences other than those based on the twin
myths.146
In fact, the main relevance of concerns about judicial independence in such a case
was at the level of perception, rather than reality. This also helps explain why it was
important, if one looks at Darrach in broader perspective, that there was an eight year
delay between the hearing of the first and second look cases. While ex post deference by
the SCC in a case such as Darrach and similar cases will not, according to my argument,
involve any actual sacrifice in judicial independence which is problematic, there is
always some danger that the public will see them in this way—i.e., mistake a decision to
engage in dialogue as simply a decision to bow to political pressure. Where this occurs,
there could be a cost to the standing of the judiciary. One way for the SCC to avoid this
will be to try and ensure some delay in the hearing of sensitive second look cases.147
Delay between the enactment of a legislative sequel and its consideration by the
Court increases both the actual and perceived insulation of the justices from the particular
political pressures leading to the sequel itself. It therefore has an important capacity to
reduce the risk that Canadians will mistake judicial dialogue for capitulation. In some
cases, delay will occur in the hearing of second look cases without any deliberate action
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on the part of the SCC, but in others it will require the Court to make strategic use of
jurisdictional control devices, such as the doctrines of mootness and ripeness.148
Compared to a commitment to narrow restatement, use of such devices will do
less to distinguish judicial review in Canada from that in the United States, where the
USSC controls its docket with a view to some forms of constitutional avoidance.149
However, if one considers the time frame of second look cases, such as Eichman and
Boerne, in which there was a one- and four-year delay, respectively, between the relevant
first and second look decisions of the USSC, it still remains an important potential basis
for distinguishing judicial review in Canada from that in the United States.150
IV.

REVISITING THE RECORD OF DIALOGUE THUS FAR

One question which arises is how the record of dialogue to date should be
assessed under new dialogue theory. In current theories of dialogue, the test is whether
decisions which invalidate legislation are followed by a sequel. Dialogue does not depend
on the nature of the response: whether the legislature agrees or disagrees with the Court’s
interpretation of the Charter is irrelevant because the focus is on the legislatures decision
to respond. In new dialogue theory, by contrast, successful dialogue requires both that: (i)
the legislature modify a judicial decision in a manner that evidences some form of
interpretive disagreements, and (ii) that the SCC either uphold the legislative sequel by
applying an appropriate degree of ex post deference under section 1 or avoid rapid
reconsideration of their validity.
Despite these differences in approach, there is a striking similarity between the
findings of current dialogue theory and those of new dialogue theory about the rate of
dialogue under the Charter to date.
In Charter Dialogue, Hogg and Bushell suggest that dialogue has occurred in
approximately eighty per cent of cases involving a SCC or “significant” lower court
invalidating decision.151 After updating their study in 2007, in conjunction with Wade
Wright, they again claim that dialogue had occurred in substantially more than half, or
approximately sixty-one per cent of cases.152 Skeptics of judicial review, by contrast,
suggest that dialogue has occurred at a much lower rate, and certainly at a rate of less
than fifty per cent.153 Some departmental scholars, who emphasize the importance of
148
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section 33 to Parliament and the legislature’s ability to contribute to the interpretation of
the Charter, argue that true dialogue—if there is such a thing—has occurred in as few as
two per cent (or one out of fifty-four cases).154 Others, who are willing to grant the
possibility of dialogue under section 1, suggest that dialogue has occurred at a somewhat
higher, but still troublingly low, rate of thirty per cent.155
New dialogue theory suggests that current dialogue scholars are largely right—
even if one puts aside the Quebec’s use of section 33 to re-enact French-only signage
laws in response to the SCC’s decision in Ford—legislative sequels have tended to enjoy
an overwhelming degree of either formal or de facto success.
Of the twelve instances between 1982 and 2005 in which Parliament or a
legislature sought to narrow the SCC’s interpretation of the Charter, four of those
instances of legislative dialogue met with a clear dialogic response on the part of the
SCC. One such instance, discussed above, was Darrach and the sequel to Seaboyer. The
other three involved the Court’s decisions in R. v. Swain,156 R. v. Morales,157 and RJRMacDonald.158 In all four of these instances, the SCC used communicative and coercive
remedies in the first look cases to counter perceived legislative blockages. In second look
cases, when shown to have misjudged the degree of democratic support for a particular
expansive reading of Charter rights, the Court showed a willingness to engage in ex post
deference and narrow statement. The Court’s approach to first and second look cases is a
model of new dialogue theory.
In Swain, the SCC implicitly rested its decision on the existence of blind spots of
accommodation in the provisions of the Criminal Code that provided for the indefinite
committal of persons acquitted of a crime on grounds of insanity.159 The Court held that
such provisions burdened individuals’ rights to bodily freedom and security in a way that
was much broader than necessary, particularly given the unfettered power of the
prosecution to put the question of insanity at issue, but also because of potential
alternative civil models for commitment. Parliament responded by giving narrow effect to
the Court’s decision: it preserved the system of indefinite committal, but limited the right
of the prosecution to put the question of insanity at issue, and introduced a separate
system for administrative committal for persons found unfit to stand trial or not guilty on
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grounds of mental illness.160 In a series of two subsequent cases, Winko v. British
Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)161 and Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre
v. Ontario (A.G.),162 the SCC upheld this new legislation as consistent with section 7
almost in its entirety. In doing so, it showed implicit deference to parliamentary
judgments about the best way to combine protection of the accused with protection of the
community. It also downplayed Swain’s emphasis on the dangers of indefinite detention,
in favour of a narrower focus on the dangers of Parliament providing for indefinite
detention without a treatment component. This shift in focus in the judicial sequal can be
seen as a form of ex post narrow statement.163
In Morales, the SCC again identified the existence of a blind spot of
accommodation, holding that the denial of bail “in the public interest” constituted a
denial of the right to a fair trial provided by section 11(e) of the Charter, in part because
other, more specific grounds for the denial of bail made such a provision unnecessary.164
Parliament responded in a way that sought to give the decision narrow effect: it repealed
the particular ground for denying bail struck down in Morales, but simultaneously
introduced a new, related ground for denying bail, based on the need “to maintain
confidence in the administration of justice.”165 When this sequel came before the SCC in
R. v. Hall,166 the SCC once again showed a willingness to defer to Parliament’s attempt to
redefine the balance struck between competing rights, this time even referring explicitly
to the idea of dialogue.167 In doing so, it also showed a clear willingness to narrow its
prior reasoning about the two exhaustive bases on which Parliament could limit access to
bail. The majority opinion recognized that it was open to Parliament to advance the
administration of justice, not only by preventing direct interferences with the trial process
by an accused, but also by ensuring that the presence of an accused in the community did
not “call into question the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.”168
Likewise in RJR-MacDonald, the SCC initially identified a blind spot of
accommodation in the 1988 Tobacco Products Control Act, which prohibited tobaccoadvertising in Canadian media and required mandatory, unattributed package warnings
on tobacco products.169 Parliament responded by expressing disagreement with the Court
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about the likely costs of giving greater accommodation to interests of freedom of
expression in this area.170 In Canada (A.G.) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp,171 the SCC deferred
to this dialogic legislative sequel, this time on the stated basis that changes since
MacDonald in attitudes towards, and understandings of, the harms caused by smoking
justified the greater regulation imposed by the relevant legislative sequel. In doing so, at a
more implicit level it also engaged in an ex post narrowing, or softening, of its prior
reasoning about the distinct nature of lifestyle advertising on the one hand, and brand and
informational advertising on the other. In JTI-Macdonald, the Court recognized both that
“information can be packaged in many ways,” and that the “sophistication and subtly of
tobacco advertising practices” meant that, at least in the case of young persons, such
advertising could be capable of increasing smoking.172
Consistent with the approach counseled by new dialogue theory, there was some
delay in each case between the hearing of the relevant first and second look cases. In
Swain and Seaboyer, a full eight years elapsed between the legislative sequel and the
Court’s decisions in Winko and Darrach. Similarly, there was a six year delay between
the sequel to Morales and the Court’s decision in Hall.
In other cases, the absence of any judicial sequel has meant that a number of
dialogic legislative sequels have enjoyed de facto effectiveness or success. While the
degree of legislative disagreement with the SCC has varied from one case to another, six
SCC cases have, for example, arguably fallen into this category of initiating a process of
de facto dialogic success: namely, Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v.
Canada,173 R. v. Bain,174 R. v. Daviault,175 Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (Attorney
informational and brand-preference advertising, and a government, rather than unattributed, healthwarning.
170
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General),176 Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs),177 R. v.
Sharpe178, and Figueroa v. Canada (A.G.).179
In one additional case, a dialogic legislative sequel has also enjoyed de facto
success by reason of a SCC decision to delay consideration of a challenge. In R. v.
Zundel,180 the SCC held that a provision of the Criminal Code prohibiting the willful
publication of false news constituted an overbroad and unnecessary limitation on freedom
of expression, given the lack of any intent requirement for such an offense and the
availability of alternative criminal sanctions for the willful incitement of racial hatred
(upheld in R. v. Keegstra).181 Parliament did not re-legislate under the Criminal Code, but
introduced a provision for the award of civil penalties in relation to the transmission of
“hate messages” (defined so as not to require a showing of intent).182 In doing so it
engaged in dialogue with the SCC about the proper balance between Charter
commitments to freedom of expression on the one hand, and dignity and equality on the
on balance of probabilities). Parliament responded by enacting An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (SelfInduced Intoxication, S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1, making a defense of non-insane automatism available, but only
where intoxication is not self-induced, or offense does not involve assault or violation of physical integrity.
176
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other.183 In Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net,184 the SCC
was asked to consider the validity of this dialogic sequel, but declined to do so by
focusing on the jurisdiction of the federal court to make certain orders under this new
remedial scheme.185 The constitutional challenge was moot as a result.
In only one instance in the more than twenty years of litigation under the
Charter—in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)186—has the SCC actively refused
to uphold a legislative sequel in its entirety. In Sauvé I, the SCC struck down provisions
of the Canada Election Act 1985 that disqualified prison inmates from voting in federal
election as an unjustified limitation on the right to vote in section 3 of the Charter.
Parliament responded by introducing legislation which limited the disqualification of
prisoners to those serving a sentence of two years or more, but in Sauvé II, the SCC again
struck down the relevant limitation.187
While the better view is probably that Sauvé II was a failure of dialogue on the
part of the SCC,188 it is also arguable that Sauvé II was exactly the kind of case in which
ex post deference was not required under new dialogue theory: namely, a case in which
the relevant legislative response by Parliament was not even arguably reasonable in light
of the text of section 3 of the Charter and section 1’s commitment to a democratic
society. While many constitutional democracies have disenfranchised convicted
offenders, it is difficult, at a principled level, to reconcile such practices with democratic
commitments to equal access to the franchise and treatment of the right to vote as a
fundamental right.
From one view, legislatures in Canada have therefore actually enjoyed a complete
success rate when passing reasonable legislative sequels in response to SCC decisions,
and at the very least have enjoyed a success rate of eleven out of twelve, (or twelve out of
thirteen if one includes the sequel to Ford—a rate of ninety-two per cent). At a lower
court level, dialogic legislative sequels have also enjoyed a somewhat lower, but still
high, rate of formal or de facto success.
Assessing the pattern of dialogue at this level will, of course, be more
complicated than at a SCC level. One reason is that any decision by a provincial attorney
general or the federal attorney not to appeal to the SCC may imply that the legislative
majority does not wholly disagree with a court’s decision, and, therefore, that the first
stage of dialogue (namely a dialogic legislative sequel) is less likely than at an SCC level.
183
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The second complicating factor is the difficulty, from a practical perspective, of ensuring
a non-biased sample of lower court decisions. Thus, Hogg and Bushell were criticized in
their initial study for deciding to include “significant” provincial court judgments drawn
from Hogg’s treatise, Constitutional Law, because such an approach could be underinclusive and might reflect the ingoing assumptions or biases of the authors.189 The
difficulty can be overcome by analyzing the more than one thousand Charter cases
reported in the Canadian Digest, prepared by the Department of Justice, as those cases
are selected by department officials for their significance on a stand-alone basis, rather
than for dialogic relevance. An analysis of that data identifies forty-seven cases between
1982 and 2005 in which provincial courts of appeal struck down statutory provisions but
the matter never reached the SCC; seven of these met with a legislative response
evidencing clear legislative disagreement.190
Among those eightinstances of legislative dialogue, in three instances—namely,
R. v. Pugsley,191 R. v. Bryant,192 and Stoney Creek (City) v. Ad Vantage Signs Ltd.193—
Canadian courts provided a dialogic response to sequels which narrowed the effect of
prior judicial rulings. In each of these cases, there was also some willingness on the part
of the courts to engage in a form of narrow statement or deference ex post.
In Pugsley, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that provisions of the Criminal
Code requiring that a person arrested for murder “show cause” justifying their release on
bail constituted an unjustified limitation on the right to a fair trial.194Parliament sharply
disagreed and re-enacted provisions providing for a presumption in favor of the ongoing
detention of a person charged with murder, unless an accused, after being given a
reasonable opportunity, could “show cause” justifying release.195 In response to this,
other provincial courts then showed a willingness to give effect to this new regime, and
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld this sequel as consistent with the Charter by
explicitly narrowing the scope of its prior ruling in Pugsley.196
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In Bryant, the Ontario Court of Appeal invalidtated a provision requiring an
accused who failed to appear to be tried by judge alone, in the absence of a legitimate
excuse for not appearing.197 Parliament disagreed and re-enacted the provision in
precisely the same terms; two years later the Court of Appeal upheld this legislative
sequel, finding that it was justified on the basis of the emerging doctrine of waiver (which
was not before the Court in Bryant.)198
In Stoney Creek, the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down, as an unjustified
restriction on freedom of expression, a municipal by-law prohibiting the erection of signs
in the municipality, except as authorized by the council, or where erected by a servicestation or builder. The municipality’s response narrowed the effect of the court’s decision
by restricting signs to commercial property, limiting their dimensions (twenty square
metres or seven metres per face) and regulating their distance from the road.199 The SCC
subsequently upheld an almost identical by-law as (implicitly) a reasonable legislative
sequel.200
Consistent with the understanding of new dialogue theory, at least in the cases of
Pugsley and Stoney Creek, there was also a delay between the hearing of the first and
second look cases.201 Three additional instances of legislative dialogue, involving
legislation enacted in response to the decisions of lower courts in MacLean v. Nova
Scotia (A.G.),202 R. v. Chief,203 and R. v. Music Explosion Ltd.,204 have also met with de
facto dialogic success. In only two cases—those involving the sequels to Minister of
National Revenue v. Kruger Inc.205 and Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (A.G.)206—
have lower courts insisted on a broad reading of their own prior rulings and struck down
a legislative sequel designed to narrow a court decision.207 Kruger also involved an area
of narrow disagreement between the court and the legislature about the need for residual
discretion on the part of courts to refuse a warrant.
Overall, from a quantitative point of view, there has therefore been a dialogic
success rate at a lower court level of approximately seventy-five per cent.208 At a more
197
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qualitative level, the record of dialogue to date in these cases also provides additional
support for the position, under both new and current dialogue theory, that section 33
remains relevant to dialogue in Canada, even when the override is passive or dormant.
At the SCC level, all four instances in which the Court was actively willing to
engage in dialogue occurred in the context of provisions—such as sections 2(c), 7, and
11—which are squarely within the purview of section 33.209 Likewise, at a lower court
level, there has also been a clear link between successful instances of legislative dialogue
and the availability of section 33. All three instances in which the SCC or provincial
courts have been actively willing to defer to legislative sequels to provincial court
decisions have involved questions about the scope or meaning of provisions such as the
fair trial guarantee in section 1, or freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the
Charter.210
By contrast, with only one exception, the instances in which the SCC or
provincial courts have been unwilling to engage in dialogue—namely Sauvé II and
Reform Party of Canada—have occurred in the context of challenges under section 3 of
the Charter, and closely related freedom of expression guarantees, where section 33 does
not apply, either in whole or in part.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE RECORD THUS FAR

In confirming the existence of Charter dialogue in this way, new dialogue theory does
not suggest that the original proponents of dialogue in Canada got it wholly right about
the relationship between judicial review under the Charter and concerns about
democracy—or about the inevitable or stable nature of dialogue under the Charter.
In current dialogue theory, because the SCC handed down fifty-four distinct
invalidating decisions between 1982 and 2005, by the end of that period there had been
fifty-four opportunities to test the presence of dialogue under the Charter.211 According
to the requirements of new dialogue theory, there were, by contrast, only twenty-one
instances in which Parliament or the legislature sought actively to narrow the effect of
Charter interpretation, and thus where it was possible to consider the potential success of
legislative dialogue.212 Even more important, less than half of those instances (i.e., ten or
209
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eleven cases) required the SCC or a lower court to actively articulate its approach to
dialogue. At the SCC level, there were only five cases actively tested the Court’s
commitment to new dialogue: namely, the four second look sequels to Seaboyer, Swain,
Morales, and RJR-MacDonald, plus Vann Niagara. In new dialogue theory it is therefore
premature to conclude, as current dialogue theory does, that there is a well-established
pattern of dialogue between the courts and legislatures.
A second reason for doubting whether dialogue is in fact as stable as current
dialogue scholars suggest is that the SCC itself has not expressly endorsed the
requirements of (new) dialogue—i.e., the idea of ex post deference and narrow
statement.213 On the contrary, even when referring to the idea of dialogue, the SCC has
tended to focus on the importance of legislative deference to the SCC’s own reasoning,
not on the need for reciprocal deference by the Court itself.
Especially first look cases, the SCC has in fact appeared to suggest that the
possibility of parliamentary dialogue implies that it should show less deference to
legislative constitutional judgments, whether ex ante and ex post.
In Vriend v. Alberta,214 the Court considered whether Alberta’s human rights
code’s failure to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination
violated section 15(1) of the Charter. Justice Iacobucci not only cited the concept of
dialogue to support the legitimacy of judicial review,215 he also suggested that the Court
could protect gay and lesbian rights in the name of dialogue and regardless of the public’s
conception of equality.216
Likewise in M. v. H., when considering whether Ontario’s 1990 Family Law Act
infringed section 15(1) for failure to include same-sex couples in the system of spousal
support applicable to opposite-sex de facto couples, Justice Iacobucci suggested that
while principles of dialogue favored the Court showing more deference to legislative
policy judgments than others, they favored Courts showing less deference to interpretive
judgments, such as those involving “[t]he simple or general claim that the infringement of
a right is justified under section 1.”217
To some degree, new dialogue theory supports the approach taken by the SCC in
these cases, because when judicial review is understood against a backdrop of
commitments to ex post deference and narrow statement, courts will have greater
freedom than otherwise, ex ante, to use all available means in order to counter perceived
legislative inertia. There was also strong evidence, circa 1998-99, that legislative inertia
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of some kind existed in Canada surrounding the recognition of gay and lesbian rights,
even if the scope of such inertia was uncertain.
New dialogue theory does not suggest, however, that popular constitutional
understandings will be irrelevant to the legitimacy of judicial review in cases such as
Egan v. Canada,218 Vriend, M. v. H, or Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,219 or that
Canadian courts should feel free in such cases, in the face of reasonable disagreement
about the meaning of Charter rights, to enforce their own preferred constitutional
interpretation in preference to that of a majority of Canadians, if such a majority position
in fact exists.
On the contrary, it suggests that the democratic legitimacy of Charter review will
depend in large part on the willingness of Canadian courts to adopt a more restrained
approach than the USSC to assessing the constitutionality of dialogic legislative sequels,
such as those which very nearly arose in Alberta following Vriend, and which did in fact
occur in Ontario following M v. H, albeit at the purely symbolic level of the title given to
the relevant legislative sequel.220
The SCC, in various second look cases, has also shown a clear ambivalence, or (at
least) division, on the question of deference in second look cases.
Consider second look cases such as Hall or JTI-Macdonald. While in Hall the
Court engaged in a form of implicit ex post narrow statement, its reasoning emphasizes
legislative deference to the Court, and not the idea of reciprocal deference between the
Court and Parliament. Even by referring to the idea of dialogue itself, it suggested that
the key to dialogue was deference on the part of Parliament, noting:
Since the introduction of the Charter, courts have engaged in a
constitutional dialogue with Parliament. This case is an excellent example
of such dialogue. Parliament enacted legislation … [which the Court
determined] was unconstitutional. … After considering this Court’s
reasons … Parliament replaced the “public interest” ground with new
language.221
In JTI-Macdonald, the Court also showed a willingness to narrow the scope of its prior
reasoning in RJR-MacDonald, but it rejected outright the idea that the legislation
represented some form of dialogue, or legislative sequel, which should “militate for or
against deference” by the Court.222 Rather, it emphasized the degree to which Parliament,
218
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in enacting the second set of advertising restrictions, had itself shown deference to the
“concerns expressed by the majority of [the] Court in RJR-MacDonald.”223
In instances where the SCC has directly addressed the idea of ex post deference,
the justices have also tended to be sharply divided on the issue. In R. v. Mills and
Darrach, for example, a majority of the SCC endorsed the idea of ex post deference,224
whereas in Sauvé II, a differently constituted majority expressly rejected the exact same
principle, suggesting that:
The fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial
rejection of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the
Court should defer to Parliament as part of a “dialogue.” Parliament must
ensure that whatever law it passes, at whatever stage of the process,
conforms to the Constitution. The healthy and important promotion of a
dialogue between the legislature and the courts should not be debased to a
rule of “if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.”225
From this perspective, it may be that it is not only the history of dialogue in
Canada which is more contingent than current dialogue scholars suggest. It may also be
that the future of dialogue depends increasingly not so much on the embrace by the SCC
of the current version of dialogue theory as a normative ideal, but rather on its rejection.
It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical, given the original concerns of dialogue
theorists, but it is also what all the “to-do” about metaphors and their meaning is all
about.226
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